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WHY TAX WEALTH TRANSFERS?: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS
JENNIFER BIRD-POLLAN
Abstract: The one-hundredth anniversary of the estate tax provides an ideal
moment to reflect on the role of wealth transfer taxation in the larger scheme
of the U.S. tax system. Wealth and income inequality are at historically high
levels, and the responses to these issues are often reduced to a simplistic polit-
ical dichotomy of "right" versus "left." The multitude of views of the Ameri-
can people cannot be reduced to such simple generalities without losing im-
portant nuances. This Article identifies three general categories of political
philosophical viewpoints that are commonly endorsed by both politicians and
everyday Americans, and then examines the current estate tax from within the
perspective of those positions. The Article concludes that maintaining a
wealth transfer tax system, perhaps organized as a tax assessed on the heirs,
best matches the political views of twenty-first century Americans.
INTRODUCTION
Should we still, in 2016, upon the one-hundredth anniversary of the es-
tate tax in the United States, ask the question, "Why tax wealth transfers?"
Is the answer merely one of political exigency? A leftover set of arguments
from the early twentieth century? Or is there new evidence? Are there rea-
sons why, in 2016, scholars and elected officials should consider wealth
transfer taxation as an essential part of any coherent tax policy? And fur-
ther, if this form of taxation is economically or philosophically important, is
it also politically feasible? Are there reasons to think that the American pub-
lic would endorse a healthy estate tax, bringing the purview of the tax back
to its pre-2001 levels, and strengthening it against aggressive tax planning
strategies that threaten to eviscerate the tax base? And if such endorsement
is possible, how best to present the tax? What arguments demonstrate the
tax's position in an ideal tax system, designed to enact the most commonly
endorsed principles of fairness and justice? A glance at the current state of
the U.S. federal wealth transfer tax system might lead one to conclude that,
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even were it desirable, saving the estate tax might be impossible. This Arti-
cle, however, outlines reasons to believe that a more robust wealth transfer
tax system, although not necessarily in the form it currently takes, is an es-
sential component of a comprehensive progressive tax system aimed at in-
creasing economic equality in this country. Further, this Article demon-
strates that wealth transfer taxation is consistent with most commonly held
philosophical-political views, when those views are examined and their log-
ical consequences identified.
Philosophy as a subject matter is most commonly relegated to the hal-
lowed halls and ivory towers of universities. An individual might dabble in
Nietzsche or Plato as an eighteen-year-old, but most people leave philoso-
phy behind when choosing a career, a life plan, or moving on to the post-
college "real world." This is unfortunate. Philosophy represents civiliza-
tion's greatest tradition of thoughtful contemplation about life's most im-
portant questions, including, among other things, how best to structure soci-
ety. One element of the structuring of society is the design of a tax system,
and philosophy has, historically, had something to say about tax design.1
But beyond specific recommendations regarding best practices in tax
design, philosophy can help us think through the consequences of the par-
ticular philosophical views that individuals articulate. For instance, if an
individual believes that property rights are fundamental and argues for the
preeminence of property rights over all other elements of structural design
in society, what consequence should that claim have on the tax system? Is
such a belief consistent with social life? Should we interpret the claim in a
way that makes it consistent with that individual's lived experience? If the
individual lives in society, benefitting from the advantages that come from
that life, should we understand the claim of priority for property rights dif-
ferently than we would understand the claim if the individual chose to live
There are numerous examples of philosophers discussing tax system design. These discus-
sions range from mere mentions of the issue, to robust discussions with particular suggestions.
Among the many philosophers who have written about tax, Aristotle includes an extensive discus-
sion of taxation in his Politics. See generally ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Benjamin Jowett trans.,
Batoche Books 1999) (350 B.C.) (discussing collection of taxes in the administration of different
types of government). Plato's Republic also includes a discussion of tax. PLATO, REPUBLIC 71
(Chris Emlyn-Jones & William Preddy eds. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2013) (380 B.C.). Im-
manuel Kant, in his Metaphysics of Morals, includes an explanation of his theory of tax. See gen-
erally KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1998) (1785). Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, in their respective works on property,
include discussions of taxation in their theories of the state. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 127,
143-44, 153-54 (1651), http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.calecon/ugcm/3113/hobbes/Leviathan.pdf
[https://perma.cclP2MQ-YP4Y]; JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 16-30
(Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1689). In more recent years, Robert Nozick and
Milton Friedman have both articulated theories of taxation. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 172-76 (2002); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 169-72, 265-68
(1974).
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off the grid, rejecting the benefits attributable to social life? In addition to
understanding the consequences of particular claims, philosophical analysis
allows us to identify what structural components might be endorsed by a
variety of belief systems.
This Article begins from this point, applying philosophical analysis to
the question of wealth transfer taxation. It demonstrates that, despite the
political opposition to the current U.S. federal estate tax, a robust wealth
transfer tax system is, in fact, consistent with most philosophical views
about property rights, social rights and obligations, social opportunity, and
government responsibilities. At the center of this argument is the claim that
political expressions of social will, especially to the extent they must be
reduced to a preference for "Democrat" or "Republican," do not accurately
represent the complex of ideas addressed by the taxation of wealth transfers.
The Article is organized as follows: Part I examines the current state of
wealth transfer taxation in the United States, as well as the current political
2
situation. Part II turns to economists and political commentators to explore
what makes the current political situation different from earlier scenarios.3
Part III addresses how wealth transfer taxation in particular can address the
problems identified earlier in the Article.4 Part IV considers a variety of po-
litical philosophical perspectives, and how those perspectives approach the
question of wealth transfer taxation. Finally, Part V identifies the particular
structure of wealth transfer taxation best suited for that task.6
I. CURRENT TAXATION OF WEALTH TRANSFERS IN THE UNITED STATES
7
The U.S. federal estate tax was enacted in 1916. Its attendant compo-
nent parts, the federal gift tax and the federal generation-skipping transfer
("GST") tax, followed closely behind, in 1924 and 1976 respectively.8 Orig-
inally adopted to raise revenues to support the war effort, while incidentally
addressing wealth inequality in the United States, the wealth transfer tax
2 See infra notes 7-30 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 44-91 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
Darien B. Jacobson et al., The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, 27 STAT. INCOME
BuLL. 118, 120-22 (2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ninetyestate.pdf [https://perma.cc/K68W-
TTSG] (discussing the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1916 which created the estate tax); David
Joulfaian, The Federal Estate Tax: History, Law, and Economics 1-1 (2013) (unpublished manu-
script), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1579829 [https://perma.cc/RSE4-RL9S]
(June 2013) (discussing the history of inheritance and estate taxes).
8 See Jacobson et al., supra note 7, at 120-22; Joulfaian, supra note 7, at 1-1.
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system was originally relatively popular politically.9 In its hundred years of
existence, it has evolved dramatically, and its popularity has waned. In par-
ticular, in the last fifteen years, largely in response to an anti-tax movement
led by Grover Norquist, the founder and President of Americans for Tax
Reform who has participated in the efforts to successfully identify the estate
tax as the "death tax" in the minds of many Americans, the wealth transfer
tax system has experienced declining popular and political support."o
The current tax is imposed at what is effectively a flat rate of forty per-
cent on all wealth transfers over a lifetime in excess of the exemption
amount-currently $5.45 million per individual (double that for married
couples)-which rises annually with cost-of-living adjustments." These
wealth transfers are in addition to the $14,000 per individual recipient per
year that goes untaxed,12 and the payment of most educational and medical
expenses on behalf of another person, which is also statutorily excluded
from tax.13 The gift tax is integrated into the estate tax, as it is levied at the
same rates, and transfers made as inter vivos gifts are counted against the
Early attempts to repeal the estate tax failed due to bipartisan support for the tax. For a dis-
cussion of such a repeal effort led by Andrew Mellon in the 1920s, see JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE,
THEIR FAIR SHARE: TAXING THE RICH IN THE AGE OF FDR 21 (2013); see also Louis Eisenstein,
The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REv. 223, 226-38 (1955) (tracing the history
and political support of and opposition to an estate tax); Joulfaian, supra note 7, at 1-1, 2-2 to 3
(discussing the history of and reasons for implementing the estate tax in 1916 and noting growing
opposition to estate taxes in the last decade).
10 The label "death tax" was first applied to the estate tax by Jim Martin, president of a sen-
iors' association. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 13-14 (2005). Its popularization as a term for the tax,
however, has been spearheaded by Norquist's efforts. Id. at 29-31; see also Stephen Martin,
America's Un-American Resistance to the Estate Tax, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.
theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/resistance-estate-tax/470403/ [https://perma.cc/UV6V-
D2VA] (comparing the general American preferences for equality of opportunity with general
American opposition to the estate tax); Joseph Thorndike, Face It: Americans Just Don't Like the
Estate Tax, FORBES (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2016/03/31/face-it-
americans-just-dont-like-the-estate-tax/#7afaa03f5bf4 [https://perma.cc/XL8V-2V4B] (citing a
Gallup poll indicating 54% support for repeal of the estate tax).
The estate tax is imposed by the Internal Revenue Code § 2001. I.R.C. § 2001 (2012). The
current rate of 40% is imposed on amounts in excess of the 2016 unified credit exemption equiva-
lent amount of $5,450,000. I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 20.2010-2(5)(ii) (2015) (indi-
cating the 2016 exemption).
12 See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2012) (implementing a $10,000 exclusion adjusted for inflation).
Section 2503(b) allows annual per-recipient transfers of $14,000 to fall outside of the statutory
definition of "gift," thereby allowing such transfers to have no impact on the lifetime exemption
equivalent amount, and to fall outside of taxation entirely. See id.
13 I.R.C. § 2503(e). Section 2503(e) allows all transfers for direct payment of another's medi-
cal or educational expenses to go untaxed. Id. In order to qualify for this exemption, the transfer
must satisfy certain requirements, and the payments must be paid directly to the provider of the
medical or educational services. Id. § 2503(e)(2).
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lifetime exclusion amount.14 The GST tax is an additional tax assessed on
transfers to heirs related to the transferor who are more than one generation
removed from the transferor.1 5 This additional tax attempts to prevent large
dynastic trusts from paying tax only every other generation by transferring
to generations further removed from the transferor.
The current state of the U.S. federal wealth transfer tax system repre-
sents a dramatic shift from the beginning of the twenty-first century. In
2001, the lifetime exemption for wealth transfers was $675,000.16 Amounts
transferred by inter vivos gift or post-death above that amount were then
subject to tax at fifty-five percent.1 7 These higher levels of tax and lower
exemption amount meant that the tax was imposed on more people." Alt-
hough the total dollar amounts were always a relatively small portion of
total U.S. tax revenue, the importance of that kind of revenue should not be
dismissed. In 2016 dollars, year-2000 levels of wealth transfer tax collec-
tions would have covered the costs of, for instance, all student aid funding
administered through the federal government. 19
14 See I.R.C. § 2501 (2012) (imposing a gift tax). Section 2501 imposes an excise tax on the
gratuitous transfer of wealth during the donor's lifetime, if the transfer exceeds the lifetime unified
credit exemption equivalent amount of $5,430,000. See id.; I.R.C. § 2505 (2012). The gift tax is
statutorily linked to the estate tax, so the tax is imposed at the rate of 40% in 2015. I.R.C.
§ 2502(a) (2012) (computing tax using the rates under § 2001).
1 I.R.C. § 2601 (2012). Section 2601 imposes a tax (in addition to taxes imposed under
§ 2001 and § 2501) on direct transfers or distributions from a trust to a "skip person." Id.; I.R.C.
§§ 2611-2613 (2012). In addition to the unified credit against estate and gift taxes available under
§ 2010, there is a lifetime credit against the GST tax equivalent to an exemption amount, in 2016,
of $5,450,000. I.R.C. § 2631(c) (2012) (setting the GST exemption amount equal to the amount
under § 2010). Transfers in excess of the exemption equivalent amount are taxed at 40% in 2016.
I.R.C. §§ 2602, 2641 (2012).
16 I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2000) (listing applicable exclusion amounts). $675,000 was itself an
increase in the exemption amount as compared with earlier years, when lifetime transfers were
only taxed if they exceeded a lower cap: $650,000 in 1999, $625,000 in 1998, progressing down
to a $50,000 exemption amount when the tax was first enacted in 1916. JOINT COMM. ON TAXA-
TION, HISTORY, PRESENT LAW, AND ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYS-
TEM 5, 12 (2015), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4744 [https://
perma.cc/YY4A-GZC8].
17 I.R.C. § 2001(c) (2000).
18 In the year 2000, 2.16% of estates were subject to the estate tax, as opposed to a projection
of only 0.2% of estates in 2015. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 16, at 25, 30. In addition,
the estate tax system collected more total revenue in 2000 ($29 billion) than in 2015 (when it
collected only an estimated $21.5 billion). Id. at 28, 30.
19 Converting 2001 dollars to 2015 dollars, the estate tax collected approximately $38.3 bil-
lion in 2001. Calculation of the effects of inflation on historical dollar amounts can be done with
the inflation calculator produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. CPI Inflation Calculator, Bu-
REAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/datalinflation _calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/UET2-RY5V].
The cost of all federal student financial aid programs in the 2015 budget is under $31 billion. Al-
ternatively, the revenue raised from imposing the estate tax at 2001 levels could cover the costs of
both the special education budget ($12.5 billion) and the funds for school districts with low-
income K-12 students ($15.6 billion) and there would still be some left over to cover part of the
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This evolution of the taxation of wealth transfers in the United States
tracks a political evolution that has created more and more opposition to
taxation in general, and to the taxation of wealth transfers (referred to by
leaders of this political movement as the "death tax") in particular. 20 As Mi-
chael Graetz and Ian Shapiro so insightfully demonstrated in their book on
the subject, the estate tax was specifically targeted by anti-tax groups who
effectively rallied seemingly disparate political groups to their cause in or-
der to create strong political pressure aimed at having the tax eliminated.2 1
In the lead-up to a presidential election, prominent politicians on both
sides of the aisle are asked to articulate a view about taxes. Their views of-
ten include a pronouncement about the role wealth transfer taxation should
play. The 2016 presidential campaign cycle is no exception. Candidates for
the Republican nomination included Jeb Bush, whose tax proposal con-
tained the following claim: "Death should not be taxable event. This reform
[proposal] ends the estate and gift tax to protect family businesses and
farms from an unfair tax." 22 Republican candidate Donald Trump previous-
23ly supported a curtailed version of the estate tax. In 2011 Trump was a
vocal proponent of lowering taxes, and his 2016 platform included a pro-
posal to eliminate the "death tax." 24 Candidate Ben Carson's tax plan also
proposed eliminating the estate tax as part of a massive overhaul of the tax
system in order to replace the progressive income tax with a flat tax.25 Can-
didates for the 2016 Democratic nomination also articulated their views
about tax reform. Unsurprisingly, Democratic candidates tend to support the
costs of the federal response to natural disasters (estimated at $15.4 billion). See Interactive Budg-
et, OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov/interactive-budget.
20 See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 4-5. "Estate tax repeal is one important strand
of a looming effort to strip from our nation's tax system the very idea that those who have more
should shoulder a larger share of the tax burden." Id. at 4.
21 Id. at 12-23.
22 Jeb Bush, Reform and Growth Plan, JEB 2016 (Sept. 9, 2015), https://jeb2016.com/
backgrounder-jeb-bushs-tax-reform-plan/ [https://perma.cc/W2R3-AUCS].
23 DONALD TRUMP, THE AMERICA WE DESERVE 170-74 (2000).
24 Trump's 2011 book, Time to Get Tough, articulates a "five-step plan [that] includes elimi-
nating the estate tax and the corporate income tax, lowering the tax rate on capital gains and divi-
dends, enacting a 20 percent tariff on all imported goods and creating a new, lower income tax
rate structure," according to the research institute Citizens for Tax Justice. Richard Phillips, Don-
ald Trump's Regressive and Retrograde Tax Plan, TAX JUST. BLOG (June 22, 2015, 01:46 PM),
http://www.taxjusticeblog.org/archive/2015/06/donald-trumps regressive and r.php#.VwFqG6Q
rK [https://perma.cc/EZY4-KU84]. Trump's 2016 campaign webpage includes the statement, "No
family will have to pay the death tax. You earned and saved that money for your family, not the
government. You paid taxes on it when you earned it." Donald Trump, Tax Reform That Will
Make America Great Again, TRUMP: MAKE AM. GREAT AGAIN!, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/
positions/tax-reform [https://perma.cc/M8GD-VU6R].
25 See Kyle Pomerleau, Details and Analysis of Dr. Ben Carson's Tax Plan, TAX FOUND.
(Jan. 6, 2016), http://taxfoundation.org/article/details-and-analysis-dr-ben-carson-s-tax-plan [https://
perma.cc/7QM7-6VMF].
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taxation of wealth transfers, as consistently as their Republican counterparts
tend to oppose it. Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton focused her discus-
sion of tax reform primarily on changes in the taxation of capital gains,26
however, she also endorsed returning estate and gift taxation to 2009 lev-
els.27 Candidate Bernie Sanders repeatedly expressed the view that taxes on
wealthy individuals in the United States must be increased. As a U.S. Sena-
tor, Sanders proposed an estate tax reform bill that would have raised the
highest rate of wealth transfer tax from 40% to 65%.28 Candidate Sanders
has also proposed increasing the estate tax rate and decreasing the exemp-
tion level. 29
Given the variety of political views espoused by candidates in the 2016
presidential election, it seems likely that taxation in general, and wealth
transfer taxation in particular, will remain a topic of debate through No-
vember 2016 and beyond. Despite the ongoing interest in the debate sur-
rounding wealth transfer taxation, and the number of vocal opponents will-
ing to fight against its continued existence, at least some commentators be-
lieve that the estate tax will never be completely eliminated from the tax
code, for reasons of political exigency.30
II. Is ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
EXCEPTIONAL?
Thomas Piketty's popular treatise Capital in the Twenty-First Century
identified a variety of economic trends in the past 150 years that reflect
changes in political organization, social will, and social and economic
(in)equality.31 At the heart of Piketty's argument is the claim that the distri-
bution of wealth in contemporary western democracies is more uneven than
26 Alan Cole, The Details of Hillary Clinton's Capital Gains Tax Proposal, TAX FOUND. (July
28, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/details-hillary-clinton-s-capital-gains-tax-proposal [https:II
perma.cc/Q5BE-9GC9].
27 See Kyle Pomerleau & Michael Schuyler, Details and Analysis of Hilary Clinton's Tax Pro-
posals, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 26, 2016), http://taxfoundation.org/article/details-and-analysis-hillary-
clinton-s-tax-proposals [https://perma.cc/9HTT-VQJ].
28 Responsible Estate Tax Act, S. 1677, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015).
29 See Alan Cole & Scott Greenberg, Details and Analysis of Senator Bernie Sanders's Tax
Plan, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2016), http://taxfoundation.org/article/details-and-analysis-senator-
bernie-sanders-s-tax-plan [https://perma.cc/2QY6-GV9P].
30 See generally Edward J. McCaffery, The Dirty Little Secret of (Estate) Tax Reform, 65
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 21 (2012) (arguing that Congress does not make any fundamental changes
to the estate tax in order to allow individual members of Congress continue collecting campaign
contributions from special interests).
31 See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Gold-
hammer trans., 2014) (analyzing rates of return on capital compared to economic growth and pro-
posing a global progressive income tax to combat wealth concentration and income inequality).
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at almost any point in the past century. 32 Piketty uses tax return information,
as well as references from popular fiction of the early twentieth century, to
demonstrate that the levels of wealth inequality in the early years of the
twenty-first century are extreme.33 Piketty goes on to argue that the conse-
quences of this wealth inequality are detrimental to society at large, and are
inconsistent with most commonly expressed views about economic and so-
cial mobility, and about the importance of equality of opportunity as a foun-
dational principle in most western democracies.3 4
Importantly, part of Piketty's claim is not only that there is a dispropor-
tionate amount of wealth in the hands of certain individuals rather than oth-
ers, but also that the longer the inequality remains, the more problematic it
becomes.3 5 Piketty's economic claim is that previously accumulated wealth
becomes disproportionately important over time. 36 This is because most
modern economies experience some period of economic stagnation. While
returns to capital remain at least steady and incomes remain low, capital
becomes more important. If returns to labor are limited, then the only way
to improve one's economic situation is to hold capital. Wage earners and
those with little reserved capital cannot participate meaningfully in econom-
ic growth. The implication, then, is that inequality of income is a signifi-
cantly less important factor over time than inequality of wealth-especially
inequality of accumulated wealth. And inequalities of wealth that survive
32 See id. at 13-16, 237 (discussing changes in the distribution of wealth and inequality over
time). Notably, Piketty is not claiming that things might have been worse before the twentieth
century. Indeed, Piketty's intuition seems to be that economic inequality might very well be worse
now than it has ever been, but without empirical evidence to justify that claim, he limits his argu-
ments to the twentieth century and beyond. See id. at 11-16 (noting the lack of evidence available
prior to the twentieth century).
33 See generally id. (comparing current and historical data to show changes in wealth ine-
quality).
34 See generally id. (arguing for a global tax on capital in recognition of the numerous and
wide-reaching effects of wealth inequality).
35 Piketty's observations about the exaggerated importance of inherited wealth are especially
relevant to stagnating economies:
When the rate of return on capital significantly exceeds the growth rate of the econ-
omy (as it did through much of history until the nineteenth century and as is likely to
be the case again in the twenty-first century), then it logically follows that inherited
wealth grows faster than output and income. People with inherited wealth need save
only a portion of their income from capital to see that capital grow more quickly
than the economy as a whole. Under such conditions, it is almost inevitable that in-
herited wealth will dominate wealth amassed from a lifetime's labor by a wide mar-
gin, and the concentration of capital will attain extremely high levels-levels poten-
tially incompatible with the meritocratic values and principles of social justice fun-
damental to modern democratic societies.
Id. at 26.
36 1J at 166.
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over long periods of time are the most problematic inequalities. These ine-
qualities are exactly the inequalities addressed by the taxation of wealth
transfers. 7
The evidence of inequality unearthed by Piketty is fundamentally re-
lated to a foundational principle of U.S. political identity. One typical re-
sponse to the claim that wealth transfers should be subject to tax is the ar-
gument that keeping such transfers free from tax ensures a free market
meritocracy, in which individuals are financially rewarded for talent and
hard work. The United States is regularly held up as an example of a true
democracy-there are no inherited positions of authority, no dynastic
wealth or family lands, and none of the trappings of aristocracy historically
evident in European countries. America has historically prided itself on be-
ing the land of opportunity, where a mailroom errand boy can become the
president of the company, pulling himself up by his bootstraps to achieve
success. By tracing income and wealth quintiles over time, however, Piketty
demonstrates that the current levels of wealth inequality in the United States
and other western democracies are stagnant.38 That is to say, class mobility
in the twenty-first century remains as difficult as it has always been.3 9 The
concentration of wealth that has grown in the last hundred years has been
passed down and further concentrated from one generation to the next.
In addition to the concern that the further exacerbation of wealth ine-
quality makes the American dream of success despite starting from the bot-
tom more unlikely than ever, there is reason to believe that concentrations
of wealth make democracy less viable. Commentators have repeatedly ob-
37 Much of Piketty's book is dedicated to unpacking this relationship between capital and
labor. In particular, see the chapter entitled "The Capital/Income Ratio Over the Long Run." Id. at
164-98.
38 Piketty spends a significant amount of time addressing the consequences of a stagnating
economy on social and economic inequality, and lack of social mobility is yet another victim of
lack of economic growth. As Piketty writes,
When growth is zero or very low, the various economic and social functions as well
as types of professional activity, are reproduced virtually without change from gen-
eration to generation. By contrast, constant growth, even if it is only 0.5 or 1 or 1.5
percent per year, means that new functions are constantly being created and new
skills are needed in every generation. Insofar as tastes and capabilities are only par-
tially transmitted from generation to generation (or are transmitted much less auto-
matically and mechanically than capital in land, real estate, or financial assets are
transmitted by inheritance), growth can thus increase social mobility for individuals
whose parents did not belong to the elite of the previous generation.
Id. at 84-85.
39 With regard to class mobility in the United States, see generally Raj Chetty et al., Is the
United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in Intergenerational Mobility (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19,844, Jan. 2014) (presenting evidence on trends
in intergenerational mobility in the United States).
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served that great wealth inequality is inconsistent with democratic ideals.4 0
If this inverse relationship between inequality and democracy is true, then
we must find a way to combat that inequality, in particular as it is transmit-
ted from one generation to the next, growing along the way.
III. CAN WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION ADDRESS ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY?
The form of taxation best situated to address problems of intergenera-
tional wealth inequality is the taxation of wealth transfers. Because wealth
transfer taxation intercepts wealth at the moment it would otherwise be
transmitted to the next generation, estate and gift (or inheritance) taxation
can combat the concentration of wealth over time and the stagnation of op-
portunity over generations in a democracy. Unlike income and consumption
taxes, or even direct wealth taxes (such as a real property tax), wealth trans-
fer taxation is specifically targeted at the transmission of wealth. The prob-
lems of inequality identified in the previous Part are primarily problems that
arise over time, and income tax and direct taxes on wealth are taxes that are
focused on one moment in time. That is, an income or wealth tax is assessed
on the current earner of income, or holder of wealth, without regard to the
ultimate disposition of that income or wealth, meaning that these forms of
taxes are less well-suited to combatting problems of multi-generational
wealth inequality. Of course, robust income and wealth taxes can reduce the
concentration of wealth in individual taxpayers' hands, and therefore, nec-
essarily, there would be less wealth remaining to be transferred to that tax-
payer's heirs, either during lifetime or at death. These taxes, however, at
least in their current forms, do nothing to combat the receipt of wealth
through inheritance. And an income tax would have to include the imposi-
tion of tax at levels last seen in the 1960s to combat the concentration of
wealth over time at the very highest income levels.4 1
40 Discussing this issue, Robert Reich writes:
As we've already seen in this Republican primary election, a handful of extraordi-
narily wealthy people can virtually control the election result-not entirely, but have
a huge impact. That's not a democracy. As the great American jurist and Supreme
Court associate justice Louis Brandeis once said: "We can have huge wealth in the
hands of a relatively few people or we can have a democracy. But we can't have
both."
Robert Reich, What Happened to the Moral Center of American Capitalism? ROBERTREICH.ORG
(Sept. 4, 2015), http://robertreich.org/post/128336881225 [https://perma.cc/585X-GPC3].
41 In 1960 the highest marginal income tax rate in the United States was 91%. TAX FOUND.,
FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES HISTORY (2013), http://taxfoundation.org/sites/tax
foundation.org/files/docs/fed individual rate history nominal.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH3J-ZJCR].
In 2016 the highest income tax rate is 39.6% and that rate applies to all single taxpayers who earn
over $413,200, or married couples with incomes over $464,850. See I.R.C. § 1 (West 2015); Rev.
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Direct taxation of wealth might help combat the inequalities identified
in the previous Part, but this form of tax tends to find opposition along a
variety of lines. Defenders of meritocracy claim that a second layer of tax, a
wealth tax, imposed on amounts that were already subject to income tax
when earned by that same taxpayer, penalizes success in an inexcusable
42
way. Further, the consumption of wealth by high-earning individuals is
not, as such, a problem along the lines identified in Part II. It is the concen-
tration of wealth and its exacerbated concentration over time that threatens
democracy. Therefore, allowing a taxpayer to earn significant income, in-
vest it, produce additional income from that investment, and then consume
it all within a lifetime, while potentially distasteful to some, does not threat-
en fundamental principles of equality of opportunity and democracy in the
United States. In this way, a wealth tax might go too far by collecting tax
from those who would otherwise mostly consume their wealth during their
lifetimes, rather than attempting to transfer it to their heirs.
While taxation in general suffers a lack of popularity in contemporary
political discourse, there is good reason to believe that wealth transfer taxa-
tion, as opposed to the taxation of income or consumption, might be most
palatable to people holding a wide variety of political and philosophical
beliefs. As this author has demonstrated elsewhere through a series of arti-
cles on the relationship between philosophy and the taxation of wealth
transfers, many different philosophical positions, which find themselves on
different ends of the political spectrum, are consistent with, and often even
endorse, wealth transfer taxes.43
Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860. This means that the highest tax rate is 39.6%, and a married
couple earning $465,000 finds itself in the same marginal tax bracket as the married couple earn-
ing $100 million. This income tax system does nothing to combat high levels of wealth inequality,
as it does not distinguish, for tax purposes, between the top 5% of income earners and the top
0.1% of income earners, allowing the very richest American taxpayers to keep a very significant
portion of their pre-tax unequal incomes. Of course, high-income taxpayers consume a smaller
percentage of their post-tax income than do their lower income counterparts, thereby allowing
them to then transfer larger amounts of that income to their children, creating intergenerational
wealth.
42 STEPHEN J. McNAMEE & ROBERT K. MLLER, JR., THE MERITOCRACY MYTH 223-24 (3d
ed. 2014) ("[E]state taxes and gift taxes ... are aimed at nonmerit forms of wealth accumulation
.... Those who oppose such [wealth] taxes often label them 'confiscatory' and argue that they
discourage work, savings, and investment.").
43 See generally Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property (Rights): Nozick, Libertari-
anism, and the Estate Tax, 66 ME. L. REv. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and
Property] (examining estate taxes through the lens of libertarianism); Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Un-
seating Privilege: Rawls, Equality of Opportunity, and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 59 WAYNE L.
REV. 713 (2013) [hereinafter Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege] (arguing that wealth taxes are
consistent with Rawlsian equality of opportunity).
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IV. Do CURRENT PHLOSOPHICAL BELIEFS COMPORT WITH WEALTH
TRANSFER TAXATION?
Identifying coherent philosophical viewpoints in the miasma of the
current political debate in the United States can seem like a daunting task.
Approaching the problem from within the perspective of the philosophical
tradition, however, gives structure to what might otherwise be a hopeless
endeavor. One of the fundamental premises of tax design in a democracy is
that the tax system should comply with a majority of the citizens' ideas of
fairness. Although this is an easily identifiable goal in theory, what that ac-
tually means in practice is incredibly complex. Economists, tax lawyers,
drafters of legislation, and politicians are responsible for taking this politi-
cal will and applying it in the thousands of particular ways necessary to
draft the tax law. Unfortunately, spending so much time in the proverbial
weeds of tax policy often means leaving behind the bigger picture. At the
same time, the loudest political voices often focus on one particular element
of the tax law, most often seeking a particular outcome rather than consider-
ing that element in the context of a larger discussion of fairness overall.4 4 To
that end, opposition to the current estate tax, while following the lines of the
"death tax" campaign discussed above, 45 often focuses on the tax as an "un-
fair double tax," "punishing death," or "punishing savings"-rather than
thinking of the estate tax as part of a larger cohesive system aimed at
achieving a particular democratically endorsed goal. This Part takes the re-
sponsibility of looking at the estate tax holistically and seriously, and con-
siders the major philosophical systems most commonly endorsed in con-
temporary society.4 6
Philosophy does not have a unified response to taxation generally or
wealth transfer taxation specifically. What philosophical inquiry can add to
the discussion is an analysis of goals and strategies that help to determine
which tax law best reflects the needs and beliefs of the society to which it
applies. As a discipline with more than two thousand years of recorded his-
tory, there are obviously more philosophical perspectives than can fit into
this Article. Contemporary political philosophy, however, arguably repre-
sents, at least generally, the philosophical beliefs and needs of most western
societies. Therefore, this Part focuses on three of the most prevalent theo-
ries in contemporary political philosophy: liberalism, libertarianism, and
44 This focus on a particular outcome is probably chosen as a political strategy because focus-
ing on a particular outcome makes for a more convincing political sound bite.
45 See supra notes 10, 20-21 and accompanying text.
46 These issues are considered in more detail in the author's other works. See, e.g., Jennifer
Bird-Pollan, Philosophical Foundations of Wealth Transfer Taxation, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUN-
DATIONS OF TAX LAW (forthcoming 2016); Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property, supra note
43; Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege, supra note 43.
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utilitarianism.47 As this Part demonstrates, examining wealth transfer taxa-
tion from the perspective of each of these theories results in the same cen-
tral conclusion: the taxation of wealth transfers is justified and is an essen-
tial element of any robust contemporary tax system.48
A. Liberalism
Political liberalism is perhaps the most prevalent theory in contempo-
rary political philosophy. Most completely articulated by John Rawls, liber-
alism generally endorses political systems that guarantee equality of oppor-
tunity, while not necessarily seeking equality of outcome.49 Commentators
generally agree that Rawlsian liberalism is compatible with heavy redistri-
bution. 0 In spite of this, much of the work using Rawls to analyze or justify
tax policy has focused on the income tax.51 Although this work is useful in
making arguments about the fundamental nature of philosophical arguments
in justifying tax policy, the income tax alone is not capable of satisfying the
goals of a Rawlsian equality of opportunity.52 Because of the vast opportu-
nities afforded to recipients of transferred wealth, the estate tax is the ap-
propriate tool to use in order to achieve true equality of opportunity. 53
47 Each of these theories is, in fact, composed of many different threads, representing a varie-
ty of interpretations of the central claims. Each section focuses primarily on one foundational
articulation of the view: Rawlsian liberalism, Nozickian libertarianism, and Millian utilitarianism.
48 The analyses demonstrate the differences in the form of wealth transfer taxation most
strongly endorsed by the particular philosophical theory in question. Although we clearly cannot
conclude that one particular form of wealth transfer taxation is unanimously endorsed by all philo-
sophical views, this Article claims that most major philosophical political theories endorse wealth
transfer taxation as such. This at least advances the conversation. If we debate what form the tax
should take, rather than whether or not we should have such a tax at all, we have already made
progress.
49 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
5o Most, if not all, tax law articles that make reference to Rawls do so in support of the propo-
sition that Rawls endorsed a redistributive liberal position. See, e.g., Anne Alstott, Equal Oppor-
tunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARv. L. REV. 469, 479, 485 (2007); Charles R.T. O'Kelley,
Rawls, Justice, and the Income Tax, 16 GA. L. REV. 1, 21-23 (1981); Eric Rakowski, Taxing
Wealth Liberally, 51 TAx L. REV. 419, 446 (1996); Kerry Ryan, Human Capital and Transfer
Taxation, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 223, 252-56 (2010).
51 See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. L. REV.
157 (1999); O'Kelley, supra note 50; Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limita-
tions on Taxation: What Rawls Demands from Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1991 (2004).
Notable exceptions include Alstott, supra note 50, and Ryan, supra note 50.
52 Linda Sugin argued that "[Rawls's] analysis of philosophical principles does not require
commitment to any particular tax system at all. Numerous tax systems could conceivably satisfy
Rawls's principles of justice." Sugin, supra note 51, at 1998. Although this may be true with re-
gard to the particular mechanics of the tax system imposed, this Article argues that some kind of
wealth transfer taxation is, in fact, required by Rawlsian principles of equality of opportunity.
53 In her article Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, Anne Alstott notes the way in
which wealth transfer taxes are especially well suited to achieve equality-of-opportunity goals
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One of Rawls's central arguments was the principle that, in contrast to
the arguments of utilitarianism, there are central human liberties that cannot
be violated in a just society, regardless of the overall good of society that
might be attained by such a violation.54 The extension of Rawls's thought in
the form of so-called "luck egalitarianism" held that equality of opportunity
within society must account not only for economic inequalities but also for
the many individual characteristics (beauty, intelligence, family connec-
tions) that make up opportunities in contemporary society.ss Rawls's prima-
ry concern was to explain how a society could be understood to be just and
how its citizens could be seen to be equal.s5
more broadly. Alstott, supra note 50, at 542 ("[E]qual opportunity ... is widely understood to be
the bedrock principle for wealth transfer taxation . . . .").
54 Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege, supra note 43, at 722.
The basic shortcoming of utilitarianism-in whatever form-is that basic rights of
individuals can be sacrificed for a collective societal goal such as maximizing social
welfare. It allows an unacceptable trade-off among persons: utilitarianism formu-
lates a principle which may require lesser life prospects for some, simply for the
sake of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by others. Utilitarianism does not rec-
ognize that everyone has equal moral worth (which, as we will see, for Rawls does
not entail that distributive shares have to be equal), and therefore recognizes neither
the way persons are equal to each other, nor the way they differ from each other.
Id. at 722 n.42 (quoting PERCY B. LEHNING, JOHN RAWLS: AN INTRODUCTION 17-18
(2009)).
5 Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege, supra note 43, at 722-23.
Freedom of fair choice, fair equality of opportunity, and relative priority for the po-
sition of the least advantaged, are not only core elements of a (political) conception
of justice, they are also characteristics of modern welfare states. Pointing to the im-
portance of freedom of choice means that, in actual social economic policies in wel-
fare states, more than has been the case in the past, a distinction is being made be-
tween the positions that people are in, and for which they themselves bear responsi-
bility, and the positions that they are in for which they are not to blame, positions
that are a consequence of the "Rawlsian" "contingencies of social life," so to speak.
Freedom of choice, in this line of reasoning, goes together with stressing personal
responsibility, provided that conditions are fulfilled such that people can actually
take responsibility for their choices.
Id. at 722 n.43 (quoting LEHNING, supra note 54, at 220-21).
56 Grappling with this issue Rawls stated:
One can try to deal with this question [of freedom] by viewing political society in a
certain way, namely, as a fair system of cooperation over time from one generation
to the next, where those engaged in cooperation are viewed as free and equal citi-
zens and normal cooperating members of society over a complete life. We then try
to formulate principles of political justice such that if the basic structure of society-
the main political and social institutions and the way they fit together as one scheme
of cooperation-satisfies those principles, then we can say without pretense and
fakery that citizens are indeed free and equal.
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 4 (2001).
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Contemporary American society has significant economic inequality. 5
This in itself is not a violation of Rawls' theory of equal opportunity be-
cause Rawls endorsed equality of opportunity rather than equality of posi-
tion or egalitarianism. 8 If the inequalities present in society had been ar-
rived at only through differences in effort, then it is entirely possible that
Rawls would accept the current distribution of wealth as just.59 Because
equality-of-opportunity theorists accept that even with true equality of op-
portunity present, equality of condition does not necessarily result, Rawls
need not critique current society as necessarily unjust.6 0 It is possible that
with the same original opportunities, different members of society end up in
different positions with regard to social and economic status. Equality of
opportunity does not necessarily view as unjust the uneven distribution of
talents or ability to exert effort. 1 If that uneven distribution of talents and
effort results in additional opportunities being made available to the chil-
dren of the talented, then that would violate the principles of Rawlsian
equality of opportunity. It is not difficult to see that if wealth is allowed to
pass unchecked down to future generations, the inequality present in the
original, equal-opportunity state could grow exponentially.
B. Libertarianism
Another common strand in political philosophy is libertarianism. Lib-
ertarianism generally embraces freedom and liberty above other political
goals, and evaluates political systems by their tendency towards the protec-
62tion or infringement of individual freedoms. Early proponents of libertari-
anism include Milton Friedman and Robert Nozick, both of whom argued
63for limited taxation. In general, libertarian analyses of taxation endorse
only taxation as payment for services-a version of the benefit principle of
5 For evidence on social and economic mobility within the United States, see generally Dan-
iel Aaronson & Bhashkar Mazumder, Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the U.S., 1940 to
2000 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2005-12, 2007) (demonstrating that social
and economic mobility in the United States has decreased since 1980 after rising sharply between
1940 and 1980).
58 See Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege, supra note 43, at 722-31 (discussing equality of
opportunity versus equality of outcome).
Id. at 724. Rawls did not actually believe that a society following his two principles of
justice would have great social and economic inequality. See id. at 729 & n.71 (discussing Rawls's
difference principle).
60 See id. at 730.
61 Proponents of equality of opportunity, however, might actually view the uneven distribu-
tion of talents as unfair.
62 See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 56 B.C. L.
REV. 1345, 1359-61 (2015) (providing an introduction to libertarian political theory).
63 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 172-75; NOZICK, supra note 1, at 169.
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taxation.64 The central tenet of libertarianism is that the government cannot
coerce action by its citizens. Only free consent to the law can result in just
66governance.
Strong property rights are another critical feature of libertarian think-
ing. Libertarians generally believe property rights are naturally held, rather
67than existing as a result of governmental grace. Because property rights
pre-date social membership, the government cannot curtail or eliminate
property rights, again with the exception of consent by the property holder.
As a result, unsurprisingly, most taxation is seen as an unjust violation of
property rights by the government. Wealth transfer taxation would be sub-
ject to the same libertarian criticisms as all other forms of taxation, namely
that the tax is immoral unless it is explicitly consented to by the property
holder. As this author has argued elsewhere, however, the estate tax pro-
vides a unique possibility for just taxation under the libertarian frame-
work.' Because the entity subject to taxation (the estate) is not a person
with natural rights, the normal libertarian arguments regarding unassailable
property rights and the requirements of consent do not apply.
Even those who hold a pure libertarian view of property rights, those
who endorse an inviolable set of rights that cannot be breached without
consent, concede that their view of property rights is consistent with limited
taxation.69 Libertarians have disagreed about the level of consent required
in order to legitimately tax property owners, ranging from Nozick, who
seems to require explicit consent from every individual subject to the tax, to
more pragmatic views, with proponents arguing that remaining within the
society or accepting government-provided benefits are sufficient forms of
64 The benefit theory of taxation has a long history, but depends on a number of assumptions
related to the calculation of benefits and the imposition of tax. "If you think markets are inherently
fairer or otherwise morally preferable to charity or government transfers that do not imitate market
exchanges, it may occur to you that taxes should be designed to match tax burdens with the benefit
of the social and merit goods provided by government." STEPHEN G. UTz, TAX POLICY: AN IN-
TRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL DEBATEs 28 (1993).
65 FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 15 ("Political freedom means the absence of coercion. .
66 See id.
67 See David G. Duff, Private Property and Tax Policy in a Libertarian World: A Critical
Review, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIs. 23, 24 (2005) (arguing against libertarian objections to taxation,
after laying out the libertarian position). David Duff begins his article by identifying the Lockean
background to the libertarian view of private property, and then goes on to say, "Although liber-
tarian theories begin with the state of nature, they also recognize that the liberty and property
rights that exist in this state are insecure and best protected through some form of civil or political
society." Id. at 24-29. In other words, while property rights are not created by government, they
are protected by government.
68 See Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property, supra note 43.
69 See id.; Fleischer, supra note 62.
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implicit consent to legitimate the tax. 70 Regardless of these differences re-
garding the necessary form of consent, libertarians have generally agreed
that taxation as payment for services received is a legitimate form of taxa-
tion by the government.7 1 This kind of tax, justified by the so-called benefit
principle of taxation, views the government as a provider of services, col-
lecting payment for those services (in the form of taxes) as part of a market
transaction.7 2 On this argument, citizens might argue that the government
should limit the kinds of services it provides to those that only the govern-
ment could provide, or to services where there is a significant increase in
the efficacy of the service or a lowering of its cost when provided by the
government. The kinds of services for which the government could assess
fees via the collection of taxes might include the maintenance of roads and
sewers or the provision of security (both local and national).73 In a more
expansive state, services might include public education, the regulation of
markets, or the provision of public healthcare. While a classic libertarian
might balk at the second set of services, the libertarian position merely re-
quires that the citizens receiving-and paying for, through taxes-the ser-
74
vices in question consent to have the government provide the services.
70 Nozick makes clear his views of implicit consent when he writes that, "[E]veryone else
realizes that tacit consent isn't worth the paper it's not written on .... " NOZICK, supra note 1, at
287. Earlier in the book he claims to have demonstrated that the reason a minimal state is not
redistributive, when the amounts paid by some are used to pay for the protection of others, stems
from the fact that those who are receiving protection without paying are getting that protection for
free in compensation for the rights they may have given up. Id. at 114. Barbara Fried demon-
strates, however, that Nozick's lack of a coherent theory of property rights and consent leads to
the result that, in certain circumstances (such as the move from a minimal state to a slightly more
than minimal state), consent to limit the rights of citizens does not have to be explicitly attained.
Barbara Fried, Does Nozick Have a Theory of Property Rights, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION
TO NOZICK's ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 235 (Ralph M. Bader & John Meadowcroft eds.,
2011). Fried claims that "in place of actual or implied consent, Nozick does away with consent
entirely." Id.
71 In Nozick's explanation of the shift from anarchy to a minimal state he demonstrates the
situation in which an individual could be compelled to pay for protection, because the individual is
benefitting from the provision of that protection. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 110-18.
72 The benefit principle of taxation, authorizing taxation only to the extent that it compensates
the government for services it provides to its taxpaying citizens, is not a view held only by liber-
tarians. For a discussion of the benefit principle of taxation, and an explanation of its ongoing role
in tax policy debates, see JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKHA, TAXING OURSELVES 86 (4th ed. 2008).
73 Even Milton Friedman himself, in many ways the father of libertarianism, imagined that a
government should provide certain services, and could therefore assess tax on its citizens in order
to receive payment for those services. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 27-32.
74 There is a tradition known as left libertarianism, in which a more expansive state, such as
one that might provide the second set of services listed above, is more likely to be endorsed. What
left libertarianism shares with the tradition of right libertarianism is the insistence on the im-
portance of consent in providing moral legitimacy to the government and its curtailing of property
rights. For examples of left libertarianism, see MICHAEL OTSUKA, LIBERTARIANISM WITHOUT
INEQUALITY (2003); THE ORIGINS OF LEFT-LIBERTARIANISM: AN ANTHOLOGY OF HISTORICAL
WRITINGS (Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner eds., 2000).
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A payment-for-services benefit principle model of taxation seems to fit
most naturally with an income tax, rather than an estate tax or other transfer
tax. Because the services in question (such as maintenance of roads, nation-
al security, and garbage collection, for example) would be provided regular-
ly, an annual accounting of the cost of the services, and the amount of that
cost allocable to any particular taxpayer, would be easier to administer than
a lifetime calculation done via the estate tax. In addition to the ease of ad-
ministration, the income tax seems to fit the payment-for-services model
better than the estate tax would because it charges the taxpayer for the ser-
vices in the general time period in which the services were received, rather
than waiting until the end of the taxpayer's life to calculate the amount
due.7 5 A society could, however, elect to administer a payment-for-services
type of tax as an estate tax. That structure would use the end of life as a
time to calculate the benefits enjoyed over a lifetime, and would assess tax
to compensate the government for the benefits it had provided to the de-
ceased. There are several reasons that this does not seem to be the ideal
scenario, not least because if the taxpayer had no estate remaining at death
there would be no way to recover payment for the services the government
had provided.
For the reasons explained above, libertarians might approve of an in-
come tax if it were designed to satisfy the libertarian benefit principle re-
quirements. Unsurprisingly, however, a wealth transfer tax that was justified
as a method of redistributing wealth from the richest taxpayers to the rest of
society is anathema to the libertarian moral view. Because it would likely
violate the principle of taking from the taxpayer only with (implicit or ex-
plicit) consent, government-facilitated redistribution through the tax code is
immoral on the libertarian view.78 As such, there is not necessarily a fun-
7 In most payment-for-services scenarios, payment is made in the general timeframe in which
the services are provided. Providing a lifetime of services and waiting for payment until the end of
that lifetime seems to leave significant room for error.
76 Under the current system, individuals receive the benefits of government services, and then
must pay an annual income tax. If an individual does not have sufficient funds available to pay the
income tax that the government assesses against them, then the government has a variety of meth-
ods available to help it decide whether to forgive some amount of the assessed taxes, or collect
from the individual in future years. For a discussion of the way the government makes these deci-
sions, see generally Shu-Yi Oei, Who Wins When Uncle Sam Loses? Social Insurance and the
Forgiveness of Tax Debts, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 421 (2012). If, however, a government held its
collection of taxes until the end of an individual's life, it seems significantly more likely that there
would be no money left to pay the bills accumulated over that lifetime.
77 G.A. COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM AND EQUALITY 68 (1995).
78 Of course, redistribution could be consistent with a libertarian model, as long as the redis-
tribution was explicitly consented to by the taxpayers involved. Here one might imagine Warren
Buffett, Bill Gates, and others insisting that they should be taxed more heavily in order for the
government to have more funds available to support social welfare programs. 'Patriotic Million-
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damental libertarian objection to the estate tax. As a logistical matter, liber-
tarian-sanctioned benefit principle taxation is likely easiest to administer
through the income tax. An estate tax is permissible on libertarian grounds
as long as the justification for the tax is limited to benefit principle grounds.
The Nozickian view of absolute property rights objects to taxation intended
to redistribute when that redistribution has not been explicitly consented to.
The form of the taxation (whether the tax is assessed as an income tax or as
an estate tax) does not affect the analysis.
C. Utilitarianism
Stemming from the nineteenth-century writings of John Stuart Mill,
utilitarianism evaluates the morality of actions on the basis of the utility
produced by those actions.79 The ethically correct action is that which max-
imizes utility the most overall, including in the utility calculus both the pro-
duction of utility and the off-setting production of disutility.so Utilitarianism
has generally evolved into contemporary theories of welfare economics. In
this model, the utilitarian calculus is done by determining the utility of par-
ticular outcomes based on the social preferences of the relevant society. Ac-
tions are not a priori moral or immoral. On the contrary, the rightness or
wrongness of an action can only be determined by examining its conse-
quences. In this sense, utilitarianism is deeply contextual, and utilitarian
analyses would likely result in different moral outcomes in different social
scenarios. In evaluating tax policies from a utilitarian theoretical perspec-
tive, one must determine what outcomes each policy will likely have. Here
empirical economic research plays an important role, making predictions
about the likely economic consequences of various tax policy actions. Clas-
sical utilitarianism, however, as articulated by Mill, included objective utili-
ty values.
At the center of Mill's theory of utilitarianism, and the element that
makes utilitarianism more than merely an ethics of self-interest, is that,
when one calculates how any particular action will maximize happiness,
one must not privilege one's own happiness over that of any other person. 82
All human beings have equal value when calculating how much happiness
aires' Lobby Congress for Higher Taxes on Rich, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.
pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics-july-dec11-millionaires_11-16/ [https://perma.cc/BE7V-JB3B].
7 See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger Crisp ed., 1998).
8o See id. at 54-72 (explaining the meaning of utilitarianism).
8 See id.
82 Id. at 105 ("[Impartiality] is involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the Greatest-
Happiness Principle. That principles is a mere form of words without rational signification, unless
one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is
counted for exactly as much as another's.").
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there is in the world.83 Therefore, even an action that threatens to impose
pain on one individual or on a group of individuals might still be held to be
ethical on a utilitarian calculus, as long as the totality of pleasure created by
the action exceeds that pain. 84 It is this universal nature of the utilitarian
calculus that makes taxation ethically possible, because the "pain" imposed
by the government collecting the tax will be offset by the pleasure created
by the services the government provides with the revenue.ss
Mill's emphasis that there are higher and lower pleasures, and that the
higher pleasures are more ethically valuable than the lower ones, serves as
the basis for thinking that Mill is concerned with more than just self-
interest. 6 Mill goes on to explain that, for example, "justice" is nothing
more than a higher pleasure that must be included in the utilitarian calcu-
lus.8 7 Justice is a term used regularly in most discussions of ethics. But Mill
argues that justice has no meaning outside of the utilitarian calculus. Valu-
ing "justice," even giving it absolute dominance over all other values, only
demonstrates that what we call "justice" must be given great worth in the
utilitarian calculus. Justice is nothing but a surfeit of pleasure produced by
certain actions. Part of what often gets left out of discussions of the utilitari-
an calculus is Mill's belief that if people are, in fact, highly moral, then they
will get pleasure from helping others.89 A world that is just, by utilitarian
measures, will tend towards equality, as those with means will experience
happiness by sharing what they have with those who have less. 90
Mill ultimately holds that there are meaningful differences between the
higher and lower pleasures, and that the higher pleasures are those that tend
83 Id. at 64 ("[T]he happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct,
is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that
of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent
spectator.").
84 See id.
Mill discusses taxation towards the end of Utilitarianism, primarily by criticizing non-
consequentialist analyses of the justice of taxation. See id. at 102. Mill claims that the only way
out of the debate about the appropriate way to tax is to apply utilitarian principles. Id. Having
pointed out that some theories of justice will demand equal taxation from all, and others will re-
quire graduated tax, Mill states: "From these confusions there is no other mode of extrication than
the utilitarian." Id.
86 See id. at 78-79, 102-104 (discussing equality and impartiality).
87 See id. at 87-95 (describing what is just and unjust).
8 See id.
8 See id. at 5 ("[I]n a properly constituted world, the individual's happiness will be found in
doing what is morally right.").
9 See id. at 63-64 ("The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of
sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice
itself is a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happi-
ness, it considers wasted.").
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toward equality and justice. 91 And because motives are irrelevant, from an
ethical perspective, laws can and should create ethical behavior by mandat-
ing happiness-producing actions.
V. How SHOULD A SYSTEM OF WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION BE
DESIGNED?
If the goal of wealth transfer taxation is the dilution of concentrations
of wealth and the minimization of dynastic wealth, then our current system
is not necessarily the best approach. The U.S. federal gift and estate tax sys-
tem imposes a tax on the wealth held by the taxpayer at death, or transferred
by the taxpayer during his or her lifetime. 92 That wealth is taxed in the same
way, regardless of the identity of the recipient of the transfer, 93 and regard-
less of the amount transferred to any one particular recipient. 94 Another
model of tax system design focuses on the recipient of the transfer, taxing at
the site of receipt, rather than the site of distribution. Many states in the
United States have an inheritance tax designed like this, most of which also
exempt transfers made to surviving spouses or direct descendants of the
transferor, although such an exemption is not an essential part of the tax.95
Focusing on the economic status of the recipient of the transfer, rather than
on the status of the transferor, allows this form of wealth transfer taxation,
often referred to as an inheritance tax, 96 to more directly combat the ine-
qualities that most vex proponents of wealth transfer taxation.
If the primary concern of the problem of inequality is increasing con-
centration of wealth in the hands of some at the expense of the well-being
of other members of society, an inheritance tax that specifically targets the
transfer of large amounts of wealth to one particular individual would best
address that problem. The proper focus of the tax should be the recipient,
rather than the transferor. An inheritance tax, focused on the recipient of
91 See id. at 87-105 (explaining the connection between utility and justice).
92 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
93 The exception to this rule is transfers to surviving spouses, which are entirely exempt from
tax. See I.R.C. § 2056 (2012).
94 This excepts the annual exclusion amount described earlier. See supra notes 12-13 and
accompanying text (explaining the exclusions under I.R.C. § 2503 (2012)).
9 See Scott Drenkard & Richard Borean, Does Your State Have an Estate or Inheritance
Tax?, TAX FOUND. (May 5, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/does-your-state-have-estate-or-
inheritance-tax [https://perma.cc/42V5-3WEB]. For example, Kentucky has an inheritance tax but
grants a total exemption to surviving spouses. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 140.080(a) (West 2010).
96 This Article uses the term "inheritance tax" throughout to refer to a tax that is imposed on
the recipient of the transfer, rather than on the transferor, as an estate tax is structured. This is not
the universal vocabulary, however, because the United Kingdom's wealth transfer tax is referred
to as an "inheritance tax," although the structure of the tax is quite similar to what we call the
"estate tax" within the U.S. wealth transfer tax system. See Inheritance Tax, GOV.UK, https://
www.gov.uklinheritance-tax lhttps://perma.cclPP3Z-FWTV].
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gifts or bequests at death, could offer a per-recipient exemption amount,
taxing all transfers over a lifetime that exceeded that basic amount. By fo-
cusing on the recipient of a transfer, rather than the transferor, an inher-
itance tax would encourage the breaking up of concentrations of wealth.
Rather than facing the same tax bill, regardless of whether the transferor
transfers the entirety of his or her estate to a single heir or multiple heirs,
this inheritance tax could allow the potential transferor to significantly re-
duce the overall tax bill. Distributing the wealth more broadly would allow
the transferor to gift more of his or her estate to intended recipients, rather
than having that amount collected by the government in the form of a tax.
Of course, many transferors' decisions will be unaffected by the structure of
the wealth transfer tax as either an estate tax or an inheritance tax. For these
taxpayers, there may be only one or two potential heirs to receive the
wealth, and it may be the desire of the transferor to pass the wealth to those
heirs, regardless of the size of the tax bill. Even in those cases, however, an
inheritance tax may bring the economic situation more in line with the goals
of wealth transfer tax proponents. Because the tax would be levied more
heavily on transfers made entirely to one heir, there would be less wealth
remaining after the tax to be transferred to the hands of that heir. In that
sense, the concentration of wealth would be broken up, at least in part.
Whether this form of the tax would be more effective at breaking up
the concentrations of wealth for transfers to a sole heir, despite the higher
tax than would be assessed on a transfer to several heirs, would depend on
the rates imposed. If the rates were high enough (for instance a tax of one
hundred percent on all transfers over a fixed exemption amount), then it is
likely the potential transferors would find additional heirs to whom they
would transfer at least some of their wealth. Alternatively, if charitable con-
tributions remained deductible, as they are currently, then a large portion of
the transferred wealth would likely be donated to charity.
CONCLUSION
The estate and gift tax system in the United States is a battered soldier,
having withstood one hundred years of attacks and amendments. Constantly
threatened with extinction, our wealth transfer taxes still play a critically
important role in the preservation of progressivity in our nation's tax sys-
tem. Indeed, as more and more empirical research and economic theory
demonstrates, economic inequality in the United States is at historic levels.
A robust system of wealth transfer taxation is best suited to combat that in-
equality in the twenty-first century. Further, as this Article demonstrates,
wealth transfer taxation is consistent with most philosophical belief sys-
tems. Alternate forms of wealth transfer taxation, in particular a system fo-
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cused primarily on the recipients of wealth, rather than its transferors, may
better comport with most common philosophical beliefs. In order to see the
way that wealth transfer taxation fits within these philosophical frame-
works, though, it is often necessary to consider them in a larger context, as
part of a system that tends toward desirable philosophical aims, rather than
as individual elements of the law. This Article attempts to contribute to that
project, thereby shoring up the U.S. wealth transfer tax system for its next
hundred years.
